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NOTES
CIVIL RIGHTS - UNEQUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS DETERMINED BY USING
SEX SEGREGATED MORTALITY TABLES CONSTITUTE
UNLAWFUL SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702 (1978).
Female employees of the City of Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power brought a class action alleging that the Department's retirement plan violated section 703 of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.' The plan in question provided equal benefits2
upon retirement to equally situated male and female employees.
The level of contribution, however, was based upon sex segregated
mortality tables.3 Since female employees as a class live longer, the
total cost of their retirement benefits was higher than comparable
male employees.' Benefits from the retirement plan were funded by
employee contributions which were then matched at 110% by the
Department.5 As a result of their experience and the mortality tables, the Department required female employees to make contribu1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). The statute reads in part:
(a). It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
The class action included five individual plaintiffs and their union, the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 18. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 706 n.7 (1978). Defendants were the Department, members of the Department's Board of Commissioners and the Board of Administration of the
Retirement Plan. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 583
(9th Cir. 1976).
2. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 705 (1978).
3. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 387 F. Supp. 980, 981-82
(C.D. Cal. 1975). The sex based mortality tables which are based on actual mortality figures
demonstrate that the average woman lives approximately five years longer than the average
man. See Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (1960) (value of joint and survivor annuity for man of 65 is
same as value for women of 70 for annuity of the same amount).
4. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 706 (1978).
The Department reasoned therefore that the overall benefits paid to women, since over a
longer period of time, would offset their higher initial contributions. The result would be a
total overall average equality for men and women workers.
5. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 583 (9th Cir.
1976). The U.S. Supreme Court also noted that there were no private insurance companies
involved in the administration or payment of benefits. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 705 (1978).
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tions which were 14.84% higher than the contributions of comparable male employees.6 The female employees, therefore, brought
home less pay than male employees earning the same salary since
their retirement contributions were withheld from their paychecks.7
In their action, the female employees alleged that this disparity
constituted unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex and sought
an injunction ordering the Department to equalize contributions.8
The Department defended by contending that the greater average
longevity of women reflected in the sex segregated mortality tables
justified the disparity because women would ultimately collect an
equal total benefit. Any discrimination, therefore, was based on
longevity, not sex. The district court rejected this position and
granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 0 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed finding that Title VII did not allow a pension
plan to be based upon broad abstract generalizations about the
sexes." The court noted that these circumstances presented a new
and unique problem in Title VII litigation. In the past, it was possible to measure challenged general group characteristics on an individual basis. In this case, however, it was impossible to determine
longevity in advance for each individual.12 The United States Su6. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 705 (1978).
The Court illustrates this disparity by pointing to the record of one woman whose contributions, when supplemented by the interest they accrued, amounted to $18,171.40. A similarly
situated male would have contributed only $12,843.35. Id. at 705 n.5.
7. To illustrate the difference, assume a female employee and male employee both
earned a gross salary of $1000 per month. Assuming a retirement contribution of 5%, the
male's withholding would be $50. A female employee's contribution, on the other hand, would
be 5.74% or 14.84% higher, resulting in a deduction of $57.40.
8. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 387 F. Supp. 980, 981-82
(C.D. Cal. 1975).
9. Id. at 982, 984.
10. See Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 584 (9th
Cir. 1976). The district court's opinion granting summary judgment for plaintiffs is unpuplished. In a published opinion granting a preliminary injunction, the district court found
that sex discrimination exists whenever general fact characteristics are applied automatically
to individuals. It noted that sterotyped treatment, whether rational or irrational, is "dead"
under Title VII. This opinion deals with the issuance of a preliminary injunction since the
court's opinion on the summary judgment is unpublished. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power, 387 F. Supp. 980, 981-85 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
11. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir.
1976). Two weeks after this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court decided General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which held that an exclusion of pregnancy benefits from an
otherwise comprehensive disability plan did not violate Title VII. Defendants petitioned for
a rehearing in light of Gilbert but this was denied by the Ninth Circuit which said that the
facts of Manhart were sufficiently distinguishable.
12. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 586 (9th Cir.
1976).
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preme Court, noting that the basic policy of Title VII is fairness to
individuals rather than fairness to classes, held that the challenged
differential violated both the language and spirit of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, in spite of the reliance on widely used
actuarial tables to estimate longevity. City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
The retirement plan operated by the Los Angeles Department
of Water and Power was similar to pension programs throughout the
United States. These pension plans are generally categorized as
money purchase or defined benefit plafis. 3 In a money purchase
plan, predetermined contributions fund the plan; interest accumulates on that sum over the years; and the aggregate of the corpus
and interest is paid out upon retirement in proportional installments calculated from the life expectancy of the recipient. In a
defined benefit plan, contributions are made in installments and
predetermined monthly benefits are paid out upon retirement regardless of the total actually contributed. Under either type of plan,
it is clear that the financial soundness depends upon being able to
estimate the longevity of the participants. 4
Pension plans resemble annuities, which are periodic payments
commencing at a specified time (retirement) and continuing
through a fixed period (until death) in return for the payment of a
stipulated amount.' 5 Such plans are to be distinguished from life
insurance in which the insured contributes toward a lump sum payment at death. The difference is that the annuity insures against the
risk of living too long, while a life insurance policy insures against
the risk resulting from premature death. 6 The operation of a pension plan is similar to a group insurance policy where risks are
pooled. Low risk individuals in effect subsidize higher risk people.
Under the annuity or pension plan, the person will collect payments
for so long as he or she lives. The total amount received is dependent
13. Bernstein & Williams, Title VII and the Problems of Sex Classifications in Pension
Programs, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1207-08 (1974).
14. Under the money purchase plan, the estimation of longevity is necessary so that
recipients, on the average, do not live longer than the projected life span upon which the
proportional payments are based. Should this occur, the result would be reduced monthly
<benefits. Under a defined benefit plan, the financial soundness would be jeopardized since
both contributions and payments are already established, using mortality tables. If additional payments were being made because of greater longevity, then contributions, either
from the employer or employee, would have to be increased.
15. Comment, Equal Protection, Title VII, and Sex Based Mortality Tables, 13 TULSA
L.J. 338, 341 n.20 (1977)(citing S. HUEBNER & K. BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE 132 (5th ed. 1958);
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FAcr BOOK 124 (1977)).
16. Reilly v. Robinson, 360 N.E.2d 171, 173 (Ind.), cert. denied; 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
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upon longevity, not the amount paid in. 7 As a result, the economic
health of the plan is dependent upon being able to estimate the
average longevity of the participants so as to determine the appropriate amount of contributions. The method traditionally used is
the mortality table.
A mortality table is simply columns of figures showing persons
at different ages, the number of deaths per 1000 persons at that age,
and the average life expectancy of a person who has reached that
age.'" This table allows the determination of the death rate of a
group as a whole. Tables of mortality are computed from the combined experience of the life insurance companies of America based
on insurable lives and are now regarded as one of the best means of
arriving at expectancy of life."9 The group being evaluated must be
large enough to allow the law of averages to operate but sufficiently
homogeneous to make the prediction accurate. Because of the fact
that women live longer than men as a group, present mortality
tables are sex based. 20 Since the purpose of the mortality table is to
set contribution rates, use of the tables results in higher rates for
women.
Given the widespread reliance on sex based mortality tables
and their resulting impact on women, the question may be raised
as to whether that use results in unconstitutional discrimination on
the basis of sex. Under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, every person is entitled to equal protection under the law.2 '
The traditional standard used to test for possible equal protection
violations, often termed the rational basis test, requires that a classification must be "reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."' "It is enough that the State's ac17. Comment, Equal Protection, Title VII and Sex Based Mortality Tables, 13 TULSA
L.J. 338, 342 (1977). If the person fulfills his or her life expectancy, as reflected in the
mortality tables, he or she will receive the full benefit of his or her contribution, no more or
less. An annuitant who dies before his projected life expectancy would not collect the total
amount contributed and a surplus would be created. This surplus, in turn, will go to fund
the additional money benefits of those participants who exceed their life expectancy.
18. 29 AM. JuR. 2d Evidence § 894 (1967).
19. 29 AM. JuR. 2d Evidence § 895 (1967).
20. Mortality Tables and the Sex-Sterotype Doctrine: Inherent Discriminationin Pension Annuities, 51 NoTRE DAME LAw. 323 (1975).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, reads in part: "nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
22. F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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tion be rationally based and free from invidious discrimination. 2 3
In certain cases, however, such as race, suspect classes are involved.
In this situation, state action will be subject to rigid scrutiny and
must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective. 4 The United States Supreme Court has not
explicitly held sex to be a suspect classification but has indicated
that gender based differences "must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives. 2 5 This distinction has given rise to an intermediate standard which is invoked because of the traditional stereotyping of females that has characterized thinking, and the fact that sex,
like race, is an immutable characteristic frequently bearing no rela26
tion to the ability to perform or contribute to society.
One court considering a retirement system using sex based mortality tables found a violation of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. In Reilly v. Robertson,2 7 the Indiana Supreme
Court decided that an annuity account operated by the Indiana
State Teacher Retirement Fund which paid lower monthly benefits
to females upon retirement was unconstitutional. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment was directly applicable
because the retirement fund was an agency of the state government
and, therefore, the plan constituted "state action." Applying the
traditional rational basis standard, 29 the court ruled that classifying
annuitants by sex was arbitrary and without rational relationship
to the object of the legislation, which it found to be to induce teachers to remain in teaching through the incentive of a preferential
retirement system.30 The court rejected arguments of the Retire23. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
24. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
25. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Court held that an Oklahoma statute
which prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under age 21 and females under age 18 was a
gender based denial of equal protection.
26. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Although this opinion implies

that sex is to be a suspect class, it is only a plurality decision. The standard applied in Craig
v. Boren, see text at n.25, supra, and note 25, is the present test.
27. 360 N.E.2d 171 (Ind.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
28. The prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment are directed at the states. To come
under the amendment, there must be sufficient state involvement to constitute state action.
See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In this case, the criteria is
met because the Teachers Retirement Fund was operated by the State.
29. The classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. See
text at n.23, supra.
30. Reilly v. Robertson, 360 N.E.2d 171, 176 (Ind.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
The Court did not apply the higher "intermediate standard" of Craig v. Boren, since, in its
opinion, the plan did not even meet the rational basis test.
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ment Fund that the use of sex based mortality tables was necessary
to this objective and did not consider whether the use of sex based
tables would have been substantially
related to the additional
3'
annuity.
viable
a
insuring
of
objective
In spite of the applicability of equal protection analysis to the
retirement system in Reilly, there are limitations on the scope of the
fourteenth amendment. These appear to considerably reduce the
value of constitutional challenges to the use of sex based mortality
tables in calculating retirement benefits or contributions. First, the
amendment is directed only at state action.32 Thus, private conduct
between employer and employee in the non-governmental sector
would not be covered. This implies that applicability to the private
insurance area is limited. Second, it is now clear that a showing of
discriminatory purpose or intent is necessary in making out an equal
protection violation.3 3 It seems unlikely that such a showing of discriminatory intent or purpose can be made in the retirement context.
Because of the limitations on constitutional equal protection
discussed above, a more effective means of challenging the use of
sex based mortality tables is through Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 3' Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 3 Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act applies to hiring, discharge, compensation, promotion, and terms, conditions and privileges of employment. Under
Title VII it is clear that disparate treatment of men or women resulting from sex stereotypes is not permissible.3 6 The very essence of this
civil rights legislation has been characterized as protecting the indi31. Id. Additionally, at trial it was shown that a mortality table which ignored sex had
been previously used for many years without impacting adversely on the fund.
32. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
33. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976). Various Courts of Appeals had
held that substantially disproportionate impact standing alone without regard to purpose was
sufficient; but the Court said: "to the extent that those cases rested on or expressed the view
that proof of discriminatory racial purpose 4s unnecessary in making out an equal protection
violation, we are in disagreement." Id. at 245. Under Title VII, discriminatory purpose need
not be proved; the Court said it was not disposed to adopt this more rigorous standard for
the purposes of applying the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 247-48.
34. As the Court noted in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976), under Title
VII discriminatory purpose need not be proved. Thus, a Title VII challenge to sex based
mortality tables can be maintained merely by showing disparate impact on men and women.
This eliminates one of the major barriers to proving a case under the equal protection standard, that of showing discriminatory intent.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (1976).
36. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971). United Air Lines rules required that stewardesses remain unmarried. No
policy or rule restricting employment to single male stewards was enforced.
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vidual from being treated differently simply because he or she is a
member of a sex defined group. 7 Title VII has been held to cover
an employer's retirement program.38 Treating women differently as
a class under a retirement system, therefore, is a violation of Title
VII 9
Even if sex based discrimination exists, an employer may still
avoid liability if he can show his conduct comes within one of the
statutory exemptions under Title VII. Under the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exemption, Section 703(e), an employer may discriminate if the classification is reasonably necessary
for the normal operation of his business. 40 This exemption has been
narrowly interpreted by the courts to require that the very "essence"
of the business be damaged if the BFOQ were not permitted." Furthermore, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines
make it clear that the fact that the cost of benefits is higher for one
sex than the other has no impact on the essence of the business and
2
is no defense under Title VII.1
A more pertinent exemption under Title VII is provided by
37. Developments in the Law: Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAiv. L. REv. 1109, 1172-74 (1971).
38. Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec., 477 F.2d 90 (3rd Cir. 1973). Early retirement option
for women violated Title VII. Differentiation between men and women in a retirement system
solely on the basis of sex is prohibited.
39. Bartness v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir. 1973). Mandatory
retirement for women violated Title VII.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1976). The section reads in part:
It shall not be unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire an employee
on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that business enterprise.
41. There are two tests used by the courts to determine if a BFOQ is permitted. Both
standards were approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321
(1977). Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) held that
"discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business operation would
be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively." Diaz also makes it clear that
mere convenience alone is an insufficient justification. In an earlier case, Weeks v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969), the same court said an employer could
rely on the BFOQ exception only by proving that all or substantially all women would be
unable to perform the job safely or efficiently.
In Manhart, the BFOQ defense was raised in the lower courts but was not addressed
directly by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals decided that the discriminatory
practice in no way affects the ability of the Department to provide water and power to the
citizens of Los Angeles, which was the essence of their business. Manhart v. City of Los
Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 587 (9th Cir. 1976).
42. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1977). Subsequent decisions have noted that discrimination
in employment cannot be tolerated, the expense or inconvenience in complying with the law
notwithstanding. Johnson v. Pike Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 490, 495-96 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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what is known as the Bennett Amendment. 3 The Amendment permits employers to differentiate between the sexes in paying wages
or compensation when such action comes within an exemption to
the Equal Pay Act, which forbids discrimination on the basis of sex
in wages paid for equal work. The procedural effect is to incorporate
section 206(d) of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII. 4 Since subsection
(iv) of that section allows a differential based on "any other factor
other than sex", 4" the challenge to the defendant is to show some
non-sex based justification for a differential in pay or, in this instance, the different level of contributions to the retirement system
required of the female employees.
Another question arising under the Bennett Amendment has
been whether Congress intended that all differences between men
and women in industrial benefit plans would be violative of Title
VII. To support the position that some differences were to be allowed, reliance has been placed on a colloquy between two Senators
which occurred during the final floor debate of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. In response to a question, Senator Humphrey, floor manager of the Act, indicated that prevailing pension and retirement
plans which differentiated on the basis of sex would not be
changed. He apparently felt that the Bennett Amendment authorized such differences; however, this assumption proved to be erroneous.47 The United States Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976) states in pertinent part: "It shall not be an unlawful
employment practice. . . for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amounts of wages or compensation paid . . . to employees. . . if such differentiation
is authorized by the provisions of [the Equal Pay Act]."
44. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). This subsection states:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate. . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees
of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar...
conditions except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system;
(ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production; (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.
45. Id.
46. Sen. Randolph addressing Sen. Humphrey: "I have in mind that the social security
system treats men and women differently . . . Am I correct . . .in assuming that similar
differences in treatment in individual benefit plans, including early retirement options for
women may continue in operation under this bill if it becomes law?" Sen. Humphrey in reply:
"Yes. That point was made unmistakably clear earlier today by adoption of the Bennett
amendment; so that there can be no doubt about it." Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't
of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 589 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing 110 CONG. REc. 13663-64 (1964)).
47. Some of the examples given in the senatorial colloquy have been found to violate
Title VII. See, e.g., Rosen v. Public Serv. Gas & Elec. Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973) (earlier
retirement option for women than men violates Title VII); Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc.
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permit differentiations between men and women in industrial benefit plans only if the differentiation can be sustained under section
206(d) of the Equal Pay Act.4 8 If the difference is based on some
factor other than sex, it is permissible; on the other hand, if there
is no justification apart from differences between sexes, it is a violation of Title VII.
The status of retirement programs under the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII, through the Bennett Amendment, was further confused by inconsistent administrative guidelines. The Administrator
of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, charged
with implementation of the Equal Pay Act, has interpreted the Act
as allowing either equal employer contributions and unequal benefits or unequal contributions and equal benefits. 9 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, however, has interpreted Title
VII as prohibiting retirement plans where the benefits were unequal e
Recent cases involving employer disability plans have also provided a source of comparison for the Manhart situation. In General
Electric Company v. Gilbert,5 1 the United States Supreme Court
held that comprehensive disability plans that excluded pregnancy
benefits did not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII. In
the final hours before adjournment, however, the Ninety-Fifth Congress passed a bill, S. 995, which reversed the holding of the United
States Supreme Court in Gilbert.52 The Act amended Title VII to
444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1971) (earlier mandatory retirement option for women violates Title
VIII.
48. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 144-45 (1976). The Supreme Court

cited this same dialogue favorably in support of its holding that disability plans which
exclude pregnancy benefits for women do not violate Title VII. The key difference between
the Gilbert and Manhart situations is that the discrimination is characterized differently
under subsection (iv) of 206(d) of the Equal Pay Act. In Manhart it was longevity which was
sex based, in Gilbert it was a specific physicial disability which only incidentally could occur
in women. It is also clear that cost alone will not qualify as a factor other than sex under §
206(d)(1)(iv). See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(b) (1977).
49. 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1977). This regulation did not apply directly to benefit plans
funded and administered by employees and employers. However, the Department in
Manhart, 553 F.2d at 589, cited the regulation as implying that the "either-or" rule was
acceptable in all plans. The Ninth Circuit rejected this position finding that the pertinent
EEOC regulations were entitled to greater deference. See note 50 infra.
50. There were no EEOC guidelines precisely on point, but 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(0 (1977)
stated that unequal benefits were not permitted even if contributions were equal. Thus it
could be inferred that equality in both contributions and benefits was required. Given conflicting regulations, the lower courts in Manhart gave greater deference to the EEOC ruling
since it was charged directly with responsibility for Title VII, which was the basis of the claim.
Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 1976).
51. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
52. Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) was amended
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make it clear that sex discrimination includes any discrimination
because of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition. In
its Gilbert decision the Court relied on an earlier equal protection
case, Geduldig v. Aiello,13 in which it had held that exclusion of
pregnancy benefits was discrimination on the basis of a specific
physical disability, not sex. Even though it is true only females can
become pregnant, the disability plan did not divide men and women
into two exclusive and distinct classes. Rather, women would be
found in both classes the Court identified under the plan, pregnant
women and non-pregnant persons.5 4 The conclusion of the Court was
that a classification composed of members of one sex constitutes
discrimination on the basis of sex only it if includes all members of
that sex."
In City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v.
Manhart" the Court acknowledged that this case did not involve a
fictionalized or sterotyped generalization about women; rather it
involved a generalization that was unquestionably true: women as
a class live longer than men." But the Court further noted that it
was equally true that all individuals do not share the characteristic
which differentiates the class. Many women do not live as long as
the average man, while some men outlive the average woman. 58 The
by adding a new subsection (k) to provide:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work, and nothing in Section 703(h) . . . shall be interpreted to permit otherwise. Act of Oct 31, 1978, Pub. L. No 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)).
53. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Geduldig was brought under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court said as to the exclusion of pregnancy benefits: "ITihe
program divides potential recipients into two groups - pregnant women and non-pregnant
persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both
sexes." Id. at 496-97 n.20.
54. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 135 (1976) (citing Geduldig).
55. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134-35 (1976). It has been argued
that longevity, like the pregnancy related disabilities in Gilbert, constitutes an additional risk
unique to women and that since women live longer, there is no discrimination in the total
average benefits available to men and women under the retirement plan. See Manhart v. City
of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kilkenney, J., dissenting). However, in Manhart, unlike Gilbert, men and women are clearly divided into two
separate and distinct classes. All women make higher contributions than their male counterparts. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 592-93 (9th Cir.
1976).
56. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
57. Id. at 707.
58. Taking 1000 men and 1000 women age 65 in the general population, the death ages
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Court concluded that since Title VII's focus on the individual is
unambiguous, even this true generalization about a class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply. 59 The basic policy requires fairness to individuals, not fairness to classes.
When viewed as a group program, insurance is traditionally
concerned with events which are individually unpredictable. The
Court noted, however, that there is no evidence Congress intended
to allow employers to resort to classifications prohibited by Title VII
when predicting an individual's risk and determining his or her
cost.60 A plan which requires women to contribute more money simply because each of them is a woman and not a man directly conflicts with the language and policy of Title VII. The Court stated
that such a plan violated the basic test of "treating a person in a
manner which but for the person's sex would be different" and
6
constituted unlawful discrimination. 1
The Department argued that under the Bennett Amendment,
longevity, not sex, was the distinguishing factor between the contribution levels. Therefore, based on the "any other factor other than
sex" exemption, the contended retirement program was lawful
under Title VII.62 The Court rejected this position relying on Judge
Duniway's statement in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
on the case: one cannot "say that an actuarial distinction based
of 68.1% can be paired. The remaining 32% of the women with later death ages would
constitute 16% of the total group of 2000. Thus, only 16% of the group, women, live longer,
or 16% of the group, men, die sooner than the majority of the sample. Using sex based
actuarial tables imposes the additional burden of the small group of high risk women exclusively upon women and credits the advantage of low risk men to other men. Bernstein &
Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classificationsin Pension Programs, 74 COLUM.
L. REv. 1203, 1221-22 (1974).
59. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978). While
women as a class may live longer than an equal class of men, some women will not live as
long as the average man. The Court notes that while they are working they receive smaller
paychecks because of their sex, but they will receive no compensating advantage when they
retire. Thus, a generalization about their class is being incorrectly applied to them. Prior to
Manhart, the statute's requirement of individual determination had not generally been a
total barrier to the employer's reliance on some characteristic. For example, courts had found
that even if it was true that women as a class were not as strong as men, the employer could
test them individually for a job requiring heavy lifting. See Rosenfield v. Southern Pac. Co.,
444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
60. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 (1978). It is
worth noting again that the risk insured against in a pension plan is that of living longer than
anticipated. Thus, women are a high risk category from this perspective. The court notes that
under insurance programs, the grouping of risks is common. Better risks always subsidize
poorer risks, i.e. smoker and non-smoker, the flabby and the fit.
61. Id. at 711.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), incorporated in Title VII by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
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entirely on sex is 'based on any other factor other than sex.' Sex is
exactly what it is based on." 3
As to Senator Humphrey's colloquy, implying that differences
in retirement benefits were allowable, the Court was not persuaded,
concluding that the Senator's isolated comment could not change
the plain meaning of the statute. 4 In addressing the discrepancy
between two inconsistent administrative rulings of the Wage and
Hour Administrator, the Court found no basis for relief. The Wage
and Hour Administrator had ruled that grouping employees solely
on the basis of sex for purposes of comparison of costs necessarily
rested on the invalid assumption that sex factors alone could justify
a wage differential. 3 The Court said that the Wage and Hour Administrator's earlier rule allowing either equal retirement contributions or equal benefits for men and women was less persuasive than
his subsequent rule that grouping employees solely on the basis of
sex was not allowed under the Equal Pay Act. 6
63. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 713 (1978)
(citing Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 588 (1976)).
64. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 713 (1978).
The Court apparently agreed with the Ninth Circuit which had rejected the Humphrey
statement on five grounds: (1) it was made hours after the passage of the amendment; (2)
the same Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act, so it was
unlikely that Humphrey's erroneous interpretation of the latter was accepted by many members of the Senate; (3) House members never heard the statement; (4) every case considering
the subject held earlier retirement options for one sex violate Title VII; (5) since the Bennett
amendment only incorporated the Equal Pay Act, it was questionable whether a statement
on the incorporating statute was significant when erroneously interpreting the incorporated
statute. Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 589-90 (9th
Cir. 1976).
65. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 435 U.S. 702, 714 n.26 (1978) (citing
29 C.F.R. § 800.151 (1977)). It said a wage differential based on the higher costs of employing
men or women is not based on a factor "other than sex" and therefore would violate the Equal
Pay Act. On the other hand, the earlier ruling in 29 C.F.R. § 800.116(d) (1977), authorized
an employer to make either contributions which were equal, or pay equal benefits. As a result
of the Manhart decision, the Department of Labor has proposed that this regulation be
withdrawn as originally written and a new amended version substituted. 43 Fed. Reg. 38029,
Aug. 25, 1978.
66. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 714 n.26
(1978). The reasons for the administrator's second ruling, 29 C.F.R. § 800.151 (1977) were as
follows:
To group employees solely on the basis of sex for purposes of comparison of costs
necessarily rests on the assumption that the sex factor alone may justify the wage
differential-an assumption plainly contrary to the terms and purpose of the Equal
Pay Act. Wage differentials so based would serve only to perpetuate and promote
the very discrimination at which the Act is directed, because in any grouping by
sex of the employees to which the cost data relates, the-group cost experience is
necessarily assessed against an individual of one sex without regard to whether it
costs an employer more or less to employ such individual . . ..
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The Court also distinguished General Electric v. Gilbert1
pointing out that the Department's plan in Manhart discriminated
on its face on the basis of sex whereas the General Electric plan
discriminated on the basis of a special physical disability.6 The
Manhart plan divided employees into two groups composed entirely
and exclusively of members of the same sex, whereas in Gilbert the
two groups were not mutually exclusive. The Department had contended that, like Gilbert, there was no discriminatory effect in their
plan because the final cost of benefits provided to both classes was
equal." The difference in contributions was thus justified by the like
difference in the cost of providing benefits. This argument, the
Court said, was an insufficient justification to overcome the prima
facie discrimination to individual women employees under the
Manhart plan and furthermore, under Title VII, cost justification
was no defense.70 The Court's conclusion was that the Department's
7

practice violated Title VII.

The dilemma of Manhart can be clearly posed: how to deal with
a valid class characteristic which cannot be determined on an individual basis. The unequivocal rule of the decision is that under Title
VII, an employer who operates an annuity fund must treat each
employee as an individual. Sex based generalization about a class,
even if true, cannot influence compensation or terms and conditions
of employment. Since sex based mortality tables embody the generalization that women live longer than men, they affect the terms
upon which women participate in annuity or retirement funds. Con67. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
68. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 715 (1978).
69. In Gilbert, the Court found no prima facie discrimination nor any discriminatory
effect. It was shown that the effect of the Gilbert plan actually favored women since the
overall cost of providing them benefits was higher than the cost of providing benefits to males.
This higher cost was carried by the employer and the ultimate effect was that the plan
provided more favorable benefits to women than men. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 130-31 n.9 (1976).
70. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,716-17 (1978).
71. The district court, affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, had granted retroactive relief. The
Supreme Court concluded this was erroneous, vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration of this question. Although under Title VII there is normally a presumption in favor
of retroactive relief, in this case the Court concluded that the district court gave insufficient
attention to the equitable nature of Title VII remedies. There was no reason to think the
threat of backpay was needed to insure compliance and, in fact, the pension administrators
had apparently acted in good faith in the face of conflicting administrative rulings and
regulations. Additionally, the potential impact on insurance and pension plans could have a
damaging economic effect and since this was apparently the first litigation challenging contribution differences based on valid actuarial tables, some caution in formulating a remedy was
warranted. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 719-20
nn.36 & 37 (1978).
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sequently, use of the sex based tables results in illegal discrimination under Title VII.
The scope of the Manhart holding is limited to the employeremployee context." The Court notes that the decision is not intended to revolutionize the insurance and pension industries, nor is
it intended to call into question insurance industry practices of
considering the composition of a work force." But whether a plan is
funded by employers, employees, or jointly funded, equalization of
contributions or benefits will require adjustments. In a defined benefit plan that is wholly employee funded, the equalization of contributions will require that males pay more than they have previously
paid for the same benefits. When costs are shared between employers and employees, as in Manhart, the employer could bear the
additional cost caused by reducing female contributions to the same
level as males or, as in the employee funded plan, he could require
males to make greater payments or share the expense. In a money
purchase plan, the increase in cost would affect the amount of
monthly benefits rather than periodic contributions. An increase in
cost would require an adjustment by lowering the benefits paid
future retirees. This adjustment in benefits would be downward
from present rates for men and upward from present rates for
women.7
Two problems are created by these adjustments. First, insofar
as the employer is required to bear the additional cost, there will
be a disincentive to hire women. Whether an employer operates a
plan himself or purchases it through a private insurance firm, the
more women he employs, the greater the cost will be. The second
problem is that male employees may react negatively, feeling that
72. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 717-18 (1978).
"Nothing in our holding implies that it would be unlawful for an employer to set aside equal
retirement contributions for each employee and let each retiree purchase the largest benefit
which his or her accumulated contribution could command on the open market." Id. As
discussed earlier, it is unlikely that equal protection challenges to sex based mortality tables
would be upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. See discussion notes 33 & 34, supra. Therefore,
this may limit the scope of liability to Title VII employers.
73. But see City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice notes that to have a workable group pension
program it is only rational to permit the use of statistically sound and proven disparities in
longevity between men and women. The reality of differences in human mortality is what
the tables reflect. He contends that so revolutionary an effect upon common pension plan
practice should not be read into the statute without some clear statement that Congress had
such an impact in mind.
74. See Bernstein & Williams, Title VII and the Problems of Sex Classifications in
Pension Programs,74 COLUM. L. REv. 1203 (1974).
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they are being required to subsidize female employees."5 A male
retiree, however, who knows the female employee worked as long as
he did, was paid the same wages and faces the same expenses should
not be overly concerned because that person may outlive him and
draw greater total benefits.
As indicated by the Court,"0 subsidization is the whole premise
of group insurance, and treating different classes of risks as though
they are one is a common practice never considered inherently unfair. A plan requiring equal benefits and equal contributions would
be merely a change in form wherein all annuitants would subsidize
those annuitants who exceed their life expectancy as opposed to
men subsidizing men and women subsidizing women." This could
be -achieved by using unisex tables."8 Under these tables, only the
total number of employees will determine cost and their sex will
have no impact. In this way, sex would be eliminated as a factor in
any decision of contributions and benefits under a retirement plan.
In spite of these potential problems in adjusting employee retirement plans, the immediate impact of the Manhart decision is
limited by the Court's language in the opinion. 9 Under Title VII
only employers are directly prohibited from considering sex in determining employee contributions. The prohibition does not extend to
benefit providers, such as insurance companies, which are outside
the employer-employee relationship."
In a larger sense, however, if Manhart is viewed as a statement
of public policy against sex discrimination, it would be indicative
that substantial changes in insurance and pension practices may
become necessary. Nearly all actuarial data presently used for pension and insurance planning is sex based. While Title VII is limited
75. Id. at 1222.
76. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 (1978).
77. Comment, Equal Protection, Title VII and Sex Based Mortality Tables, 13 TULsA
L.J. 338, 361 (1977).
78. Bernstein & Williams, supra note 74 at 1229.
79. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 717-18 (1978).
"[Wie do not suggest that the statute was intended to revolutionize the insurance and
pension industries . . . . Nor does (our holding) call into question the insurance industry
practice of considering the composition of an employer's work force in determining the probable cost of a retirement or death benefit plan." Id.
80. The First Circuit has found the employee-employer relationship to be sufficient
under Title VII in a case where an annuity association was completely separate from a college.
Even though the employees looked solely to the association (the Teacher's Insurance Annuity
Association, TIAA) for payment, the fact that the college required all employees to participate and established a method for premium payments brought it within the scope of the
Manhart decision. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Colby College, 589 F.2d 1139
(1st Cir. 1978).
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in its reach, there are many other federal and state regulations
which could be used to change pension practices. 1 A strong public
policy against sex discrimination, coupled with the rule of Manhart
that even true generalizations about a class cannot be applied to
individuals, would affect assumptions that are basic to present financial planning. The ultimate impact of the decision will be measured by how insurance and pension practices change, the interpretation courts give to the decision and whether Congress acts to
expand or limit the Manhart rule.
Harold E. Rainbolt
81. Insurance commissioners in the various states will, of course, interpret the Manhart
decision in light of their state laws, but changes could be required in current practices. Also
one commentator has suggested that if the prohibitions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) are applied to retirement plans using the same reasoning found in
Manhart, discrimination against individuals can be shown. See Rothman, Discriminationby
Sex and Age in Pension, Annuities and Life Insurance, 672 INs. L.J. 30 (1979).

